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Abstract 
 
 
We provide an example of an outcome game form with two players for which there is in an open set of 
utilities for both players such that, in each of the associated games, the set of Nash equilibria induce a 
continuum of outcome distributions. The case for three or more players has been settled by Govindan and 
McLennan [3]. 
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1. Introduction
If one perturbs independently the values of the utility functions in
a finite normal form game, then generically there is a finite number of
equilibria (see Harsanyi [4]).
However, when the normal form is derived from an extensive form,
Harsanyi’s result has no immediate implications, because many strate-
gies lead to the same final node. Even if the payoffs of the final nodes
can be perturbed independently, the finiteness of the number of equi-
libria is not necessarily a generic property. There can be constructed
many examples of extensive forms where it is not. On such grounds,
Kreps and Wilson [5] criticized Harsanyi’s result as not being useful
for extensive forms.
As noted by Govindan and McLennan [3], “Kreps and Wilson [5]
proved a theorem that responds to this critique.” Govindan and McLen-
nan [2] made a direct proof of the same result. This result states that
if the payoffs of the final nodes can be perturbed independently, the
finiteness of the distributions on the terminal nodes (paths) induced
by sequential equilibria is a generic property. And this remains true if
one considers paths induced by Nash equilibria.
However, as noted by Mas-Colell [7], “the Kreps and Wilson [5] crit-
icism to the normal form result can be reiterated.” Govindan and
McLennan [3] pointed out in the same direction: “Many games arising
in economic models, and in other contexts, have sets of terminal nodes
that are naturally regarded as a priori equivalent for reasons arising
out of the nature of the phenomenon being modeled.”
Therefore, the case in which the payoffs of the final nodes are tied to-
gether by convex linear constraints (see Govindan and McLennan [3], [1]
and Mas-Colell [7]) is of high conceptual interest. As further noted by
Govindan and McLennan [3], in this case “...the ‘relevant’ space of ter-
minal node utilities is a linear subspace of the space of all terminal
node utilities, and generic finiteness in the subspace does not follow
from Kreps and Wilson’s theorem.”
This note continues the above line of research in that it addresses the
following question: is it the case that, in the relevant space of terminal
node utilities (i.e. when the payoffs of the final nodes are tied together
by convex linear constraints), generically there are only finitely many
outcome distributions (i.e. distributions on the relevant set of terminal
nodes) induced by the Nash equilibria?
When the number of players is strictly greater than two, Govindan
and McLennan [3] provide an example of a game form that shows that,
in open set of utilities, the Nash equilibria of the associated game induce
a continuum of outcome distributions. In that work, they also prove
that in some special cases (e.g. with two outcomes and any number of
players) the answer to the above question is positive.
However, for games with two players, the above issue has been only
partially addressed and the general question for this case has remained
unanswered until now. Mas–Colell [7] shows that for two person games
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the equilibrium payoffs are generically finite. Govindan and McLen-
nan [1] prove that for every bimatrix game form, the equilibrium dis-
tributions on outcomes are generically finite in the space of zero sum
and common interest utility games.
In this note, we show that the answer to the previous question con-
tinues to be negative for two player games. We provide an example of
a game form and an open set of utilities, such that in each of the as-
sociated games there is a continuum of outcome distributions induced
by the Nash equilibria.
2. The conjecture
Let Ω be a finite outcome space and let S1, S2 denote the finite
strategy spaces of each of the two players. An outcome game form is
a mapping θ : S1 × S2 → Ω. The utilities of the players are defined by
the functions ui : Ω → R, i = 1, 2.
For each i = 1, 2, let Δi = {μ ∈ RSi++ :
∑
x∈Si μ(x) = 1}. A pair of
strategy vectors pi ∈ Δi of the players induces a probability distribution
in Ω.
An outcome game form θ and the utilities of the players ui, i =
1, 2 determine a bimatrix game. We denote by A(ui) the associated
matrices of utilities of the players in this game. That is, the entry ajl
of A(ui) is ui(θ(sj, sl)).
A completely mixed Nash equilibrium in this game consists of two
strategy vectors p1 ∈ Δ1 and p2 ∈ Δ2 such that
A(u2) p1 = β e for some β ∈ R.
p2 A(u1) = α e for some α ∈ R.
where e denotes the vector (in the appropriate Euclidean space) with
all of its entries equal to 1.
Conjecture 1. For every bimatrix game form θ, there is a generic set
of utilities in RΩ × RΩ for which the set of distributions induced on
outcomes by the completely mixed Nash equilibria is finite.
For the case of two person games, this conjecture corresponds to
Conjecture T in Govindan and McLennan [3]. They disprove the con-
jecture for games with more than two players.
3. The example
We now give an example that shows that Conjecture 1 does not hold.
Let there be four outcomes, denoted by Ω = {a, b, c, d}. And consider
the outcome matrix
A(a, b, c, d) =
(
c a b b
d a a b
c d b c
)
Let us use the notation ai = ui(a), bi = ui(b), ci = ui(c), di = ui(d),
and ui = (ai, bi, ci, di) ∈ R4 for the utilities of agent i = 1, 2. We denote
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G = {(u1, u2) ∈ R8 | d1, b1 < a1, c1 & d2 < b2 < a2, c2}, an open subset
in the space of utilities. For each (u1, u2) ∈ G and t ∈ R, we define
p1(u
2) =
1
a2 − b2 + c2 − d2 (b2 − d2, c2 − b2, a2 − b2) ∈ R
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and
p2(u
1; t) =
( a1 − b1
a1 − b1 + c1 − d1 −
(a1 − b1)t
a1 − d1 ,
(c1 − d1)t
a1 − d1 ,
c1 − d1
a1 − b1 + c1 − d1 −
(c1 − d1)t
a1 − d1 , t
)
∈ R4.
One checks immediately that the pair 〈p1(u2), p2(u1; t)〉 is a completely
mixed Nash equilibrium provided t is positive and small enough. The
probability of outcome a induced by the equilibrium is computed easily
as
pa =
(b2 − c2)(c1 − d1)
(a1 − b1 + c1 − d1)(−a2 + b2 − c2 + d2)
+
b2(d1 − c1) + b1(c2 − d2) + c1d2 − c2d1
(a1 − d1)(−a2 + b2 − c2 + d2) t
Therefore, there is a continuum of equilibrium probability distributions
(i.e. for t positive and small enough) on the set of outcomes as long
as (u1, u2) ∈ G and b2(d1 − c1) + b1(c2 − d2) + c1d2 − c2d1 = 0; such
values of u1 and u2 form an open subset in the space of utilities. Re-
mark that when u1 = ±u2, the coefficient of t in the above expression
for pa (as well as for the other outcomes) disappears and there is a
unique probability distribution on outcomes, as proved in Govindan
and McLennan [1] and Litan [6].
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